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FOREWORD: THE NEW COURT SEARCHES FOR IDENTITY
NATHANIEL L. NATHANSON*
The editors of the Journal have asked me to
comment on the dominant mood of the present
Supreme Court as reflected generally in October
Term, 1970. Anyone who takes this assignment
seriously, as of course I do, is doomed to consider-
able frustration. The Court, these days, is, most of
all, a many-splintered thing. Certain members,
primarily Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Mar-
shall, are fighting a desperate rear-guard action
to preserve as much as possible of the civil liber-
tarian gains or thrust of the Warren Court, as
they understand them. Most of the time, they
have been joined by Mr. justice Black, subject,
of course, to his own "latter day" peculiarities, or
as he would prefer to put it, his exquisite faithful-
ness to his fundamental principle that the Consti-
tution must be read as it was written, or obviously
intended, by the Founding Fathers, or the framers
of the particular amendment.1 Occasionally too
they have been joined by Mr. justice Harlan,
faithful either to some profound conviction of his
own regarding some aspect of civil liberties, as for
* Frederic P. Vose Professor of Law, Northwestern
University. Member, Massachusetts and Illinois Bars.
Author, AnmiNsTRATIVE LAW (with L. Jaffe) (1968);
FEDERAL. REGULATION o TRANSPORTATION (with
C. Auerbach) (1954). A.B., 1929, LL.B., 1932, Yale U.;
S.J.D., 1933, Harvard U.
IMr. Justice Black's adherence to these constitu-
tional principles was illustrated in his one dissent from
the Court's opinion in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971), which was, in his words, "a strange
case and a strange holding." Id. at 389. Mr. Justice
Harlan's majority opinion held that a state could not
preclude indigents from gaining relief in its divorce
courts because of inability to pay fines and court costs.
In dissent, Justice Black held that the Constitution did
not require the application of the due process standards,
mandated for criminal proceedings, to litigation of a
purely civil nature. In Justice Black's view:
Our federal Constitution, therefore, does not place
such private disputes on the same high level as it
places criminal trials and punishment. There is
consequently no necessity, no reason, why govem-
ment should in civil trials be hampered or handi-
capped by the strict and rigid due process rules the
Constitution has provided to protect people
charged with crime.
Id. at 391.
example, the values of privacy,2 or more reluc-
tantly, to his respect for the value of consistency,
even when the underlying doctrine is one with
which he disagrees. 3 So too they have occasionally
been joined by either Mr. justice White or Mr.
justice Stewart, the least doctrinaire or easily
classifiable members of the Warren Court. Finally,
it is only fair to add that there have been times
when even the Chief justice and Mr. Justice
Blackmun have joined with justices Douglas,
Brennan, and Marshall, or some of them, to form
either a majority, or a minority, or even a unani-
mous Court.4 So much for the game of nose count-
2See Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 768 (1971), where
he made this comment on the values of privacy:
The impact of the practice of third-party bugging,
must, I think, be considered such as to undermine
that confidence and sense of security in dealing
with one another that is characteristic of individual
relationships between citizens in a free society.
401 U.S. at 787.
3 See Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S.
494, 503 (1971), where the Court held a shipowner was
not liable to an injured longshoreman. Even though
Justice Harlan disagreed with the trend toward absolute
liability for "unseaworthiness," he dissented, along with
Justices Douglas, Black, and Brennan, because he
thought that consistency with prior decisions required
the shipowner to be held liable in this case.
4 The most significant of the unanimous decisions
last term, some of which contain concurring opinions,
include the following: Swanm v. Board of Education,
402 U.S. 1 (1971) (upholding, in a carefully restrained
opinion, a plan for limited busing of black students in
Charlotte, North Carolina); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535 (1971) (holding unconstitutional as violative of
procedural due process the Georgia Motor Vehicle
Safety Responsibility Act, which provided that if an
uninsured motorist is involved in an accident and fails
to post security for damages claimed, his license would
be revoked); Procunier v. Atchiey, 400 U.S. 446 (1971)
(denying federal habeas corpus relief to petitioner who
challenged the voluntariness of a statement introduced
at his trial, where his petition failed to include a version
of events establishing that the statement was involun-
tary); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971)
(holding the due process clause requires that a disrup-
tive defendant be tried for contempt before a different
judge than the one who presided over the contemptuous
behavior); Relford v. Commonwealth, 401 U.S. 355
(1971) (sustaining court-martial jurisdiction over a
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ing, as it is played at legal cocktail parties, or more
scientifically by devotees of the computer culture.
On a somewhat more substantive level, the
Court in October Term, 1970, did not, overtly at
least, give the lie to the principle announced by
Mr. Justice Goldberg in this year's Rosenthal
Lectures5 that the Court is not likely to, and should
not easily, surrender new ground once gained in
the protection of individual liberties, excluding of
course freedom of contract. The closest it came was
probably in Harris v. New Yokk, 6 a five-four de-
cision refusing to apply the procedural safeguards
of Miranda7 so as to exclude a statement made to
the police by the defendant without benefit of a
warning regarding the right to appointed counsel,
when the statement was used only to impeach the
defendant's credibility as a witness in his own
defense. The dissenters were Justices Black, Bren-
nan, Douglas and Marshall, all four of whom had
joined in the opinion in Miranda. Chief Justice
Burger's opinion for the Court was joined by
Justices White, Harlan, and Stewart, all three of
whom dissented in Miranda, as well as by Mr.
Justice Blackmun. The dissenting opinion written
by Mr. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices
Douglas and Marshall, but not by Mr. Justice
Black, who simply noted his dissent without ex-
serviceman charged with committing crimes on a mili-
tary base against persons who were properly at the
base); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (finding it is a
denial of equal protection to limit punishment to pay-
ment of a fine if one is able to pay it, while the fine is
converted to a prison term for an indigent defendant);
United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971) (deciding
"transferor" registration under the National Firearms
Act as amended does not violate the self-incrimination
clause of the fifth amendment, as it is the transferor
who makes the statements while photographs and
fingerprints supplied by the transferee are merely
"trifling or imaginary hazards of incrimination");
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding
Civil Rights Act of 1964 precludes the use of testing as
a condition of employment unless the test demonstrates
a reasonable measure of job performance); Blount v.
Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971) (voiding 39 U.S.C. §§4006-
07 (1964), which authorized the Postmaster General,
following administrative hearings, to halt the use of the
mails and of postal money orders for commerce in al-
legedly obscene materials; the Court found the statute
violated the first amendmenit right of free speech as it
did not provide for governmentally initiated judicial
participation in the procedure or prompt judicial re-
view).
5Rosenthal lectures by Justice Goldberg, "The
Supreme Court of the United States: Some Reflections
On Its Past, Present and Future," Northwestern Uni-
versity School of Law, Mar. 3, 4, and 5, 1971, to be
published by Northwestern University Press under the
title of "Equal Justice."
6 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 438 (1966).
planation.8 Besides elaborating the obvious factual
distinction between affirmative use of evidence
unlawfully obtained, and its use for purposes of
impeachment, Chief Justice Burger's brief opinion
in Harris dismissed broader statements from
Miranda, apparently disregarding the distinction,
as "not at all necessary to the Court's holding"
and consequently not "controlling." 9 More im-
portant was the Chief Justice's comment:
The impeachment process here undoubtedly
provided valuable aid to the jury in assessing peti-
tioner's credibility, and the benefits of this process
should not be lost, in our view, because of the spec-
ulative possibility that impermissible police con-
duct will be encouraged thereby. Assuming that
the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect on pro-
scribed police conduct, sufficient deterrence flows
when the evidence in question is made unavailable
to the prosecution in its case in chief. 10
Mr. Justice Brennan's response to this comes as
no surprise:
The Court today tells the police they may freely
interrogate an accused incommunicado, and with-
out counsel and know that although any statement
they obtain in violation of Miranda can't be used
in the State's direct case, it may be introduced if
the defendant has the temerity to testify in his
own defense."
In qualifying the reach of Miranda, as it did in
Harris, the Burger Court struck its predecessor in
one of its most vulnerable positions. Apart from
the five-four character of Miranda, it was the most
vigorously criticized decision of the Warren Court
since its early days when communism, loyalty, and
Congressional investigatory powers were live
issues."2 Now that our major domestic concern
8 The reason for Justice Black's refusal to join Justice
Brennan's dissenting opinion or to state his own views
separately still escapes me.
9 401 U.S. at 224.
10 Id. at 225.
" Id. at 232.
" The debate over Miranda continues at all levels,
and several empirical studies of the effectiveness of
custodial warnings have done little to quiet the contro-
versy. See, e.g., Medalie, Zeitz, & Alexander, Custodial
Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The At-
tempt to Implement Miranda, 66 Mica. L. Rzv. 1347
(1968); Project, Interrogations in New Haven: The Im-
pact of Miranda, 76 YALa L. J. 1519 (1967); Robinson,
Police and Prosecutor Practices and Attitudes Relating
to Interrogation As Revealed by Pre- and Post-Miranda
Questionnaires: A Construct of Police Capacity to Comply,
1968 DuKE L. J. 425.
A comparable storm of public debate was touched off
by the Court's decision in Watkins v. United States,
[Vol. 62
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about law enforcement is directed not at sub-
version in a political sense, but rather at crime as
a threat to personal safety and security, constitu-
tional decisions dealing with the rights of de-
fendants in ordinary criminal trials have replaced
constitutional rights of political dissent as the
most sensitive area of constitutional adjudication.
We know from his public utterances how the
present Attorney General feels about these issues,
characterized in his London speech as a "sea of
legalisms." 13 We know too, from his own opinions,
that the present Chief Justice is not entirely out
of tune with the Attorney General's view.
Besides the skepticism intimated in Harris about
the value of exclusionary rules, the Chief Justice
was much more explicit about his views in his
partially dissenting and concurring opinion in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire,4 itself one of the most
difficult cases of the Term, and in his dissenting
opinion in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents.'5
In Coolidge the Chief Justice spoke of the "mon-
strous price we pay for the Exclusionary Rule in
which we seem to have imprisoned ourselves",
16
and in Bivens he urged Congress to enact a statute
creating a cause of action for any person aggrieved
by conduct of governmental agents in violation of
the fourth amendment or statutes regulating
official conduct, while at the same time directing
that no evidence, otherwise admissible, should be
excluded from any criminal proceeding because of
violation of the fourth amendment 7 It is notable
that the Chief Justice did not suggest any way
that Congress might try to nulify the Miranda
rule itself.
Another example of qualification of a momentous
decision of the Warren Court was the decision in
354 U.S. 178 (1957), where it reversed the conviction of
a witness, who while admitting his own prior member-
ship in the Communist Party, had refused to reply to
questions of a subcommittee of the House Committee
on Un-American Activities regarding the Communist
associations of other people. For a discussion of this
case and the criticism that followed see Alfange, Con-
gressional Investigations and the Fickle Court, 30 U. Ciw.
L. REv. 113 (1961); Bxct, CoiqnrmT or CoxoREss
(1959); Comment, The Congressional Investigating
Power: Ramifications of the Watkins-Barenblatt Enigma,
14 U. Mua L. REv. 381 (1960). The Court later in
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1958), re-
treated from some of the broader implications of Wat-
kins.
13 40 U.S.L.W. 2064 (July 27, 1971), N.Y. Times,
July 17, 1971, at 1, col. 3.
"t 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2051 (1971).Is 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971).
16 91 S. Ct. at 2051.
17 403 U.S. at 421-24.
United States v. White"6 which limited the applica-
tion of Katz v. United States 9 in a manner some-
what reminiscent of Harris' limitation on Miranda.
The difference between Katz and White" was,
however, more substantial than that between
Miranda and Harris. Katz involved recordation of
a telephone conversation-without the defendant's
knowledge--by attachment of a listening device
to the telephone booth which the defendant was
using. White involved the monitoring of conversa-
tions between the defendant and an informer who
carried a concealed electronic device which trans-
mitted the conversations to federal agents who
testified as to their contents. The Court in a six-
three decision sustained the admission of the evi-
dence, Justices Harlan, Marshall, and Douglas
dissenting. The vote on the fourth amendment
issue, however, was really five-four because Mr.
Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment on the
(in my view) curious ground that Katz was not
retrospective, while Mr. Justice Black concurred
on the ground that Katz was wrongly decided."
Consequently, Mr. Justice White spoke only for
"8401 U.S. 745 (1971). In White, conversations be-
tween petitioner and an informer were electronically
transmitted to government agents. At trial, only the
agents testified to these conversations because the in-
former was unavailable. The plurality opinion of Justice
White relied on Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
(1966), and Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427
(1963), for the proposition that expectations of privacy
in conversations with apparent colleagues are not pro-
tected by the fourth amendment. It was Justice White's
view that if expectations of privacy are not constitu-
tionally invaded when an informer testifies, then those
expectations are no more invaded when several "in-
formers" are listening to the conversation.
19 389 U.S. 347 (1968). Petitioner was convicted on a
charge of conveying gambling information by telephone.
At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of state-
ments made by petitioner in a phone conversation which
was recorded by FBI agents. The agents had placed a
recording device outside the phone booth from which
petitioner made his call. The Court rejected the govern-
ment's argument that the search was constitutional be-
cause the phone booth was not physically penetrated.
Instead of concentrating on the "penetration" notion,
the Court focused on whether an individual might jus-
tifiably rely on privacy while using a telephone booth.
The Court's answer was affirmative and therefore the
recording of petitioner's conversation amounted to an
unconstitutional search and seizure because no warrant
was bbtained.
20 Katz was a straightforward electronic eavesdrop-
ping case and the Court held that a search warrant was
required. White was also an eavesdropping case but
with the difference that agents overheard conversations
between the principal and an informer. Previous Su-
preme Court decisions held that such private conversa-
tions are not shielded by a fourth amendment tight of
privacy. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
21401 U.S. at 754-56.
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four members of the Court: himself, the Chief
Justice, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice
Blackmun. The "plurality opinion" undertook to
distinguish Katz and to rehabilitate On Lee v.
United States, 2 which Mr. Justice Brennan and the
three dissenters regarded as discredited by Katz.2
- 343 U.S. 747 (1952). In On Lee, a federal narcotics
agent overheard via transmitter conversations between
petitioner and an old friend of petitioner's. This friend
had become a government informer and, equipped with
a transmitting device, he engaged petitioner in conver-
sations which touched on petitioner's dealings in nar-
cotics. At trial, only the eavesdropping agent testified
to these conversations. Petitioner argued on appeal that
this testimony should have been excluded. The Court,
however, held the testimony admissible, finding no
fourth amendment violation because no trespass to
petitioner's establishment was shown. The Court also
rejected an argument that the agent's conduct
amounted to wiretapping in contravention of federal
law.
The debate over the vitality of On Lee continues in
White, but the exact issue is better illustrated in Lopez
v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). There a federal
revenue agent was offered money by petitioner, who
operated an inn which was being investigated for pos-
sible tax evasion. When the agent later returned to the
inn, he carried a wire recorder and recorded a conversa-
tion with petitioner as he consummated the bribe. At
trial, the agent testified to the conversation and the
wire recording was received in evidence over defense
counsel's motion to suppress. The Court held the wire
recording admissible on the ground that the government
had not used an electronic device to listen in on conver-
sations it could not otherwise have heard.
The Court's opinion did not discuss the question
whether such a recording could be used only for pur-
poses of corroboration. Chief Justice Warren's con-
curring opinion distinguished On Lee from Lopez be-
cause in Lopez the recording was used only to corrob-
orate an agent's testimony, while in On Lee the record-
ing was the sole evidence of the conversation. Justice
Brennan, in dissent, would have held the recordings
inadmissible in both On Lee and Lopez on the ground
that a recording is not merely corroborative but rather
independent third-party evidence. In his view, one ac-
cepts the risk of revelation by the other party to a
private conversation, but one does not in the same con-
versation accept the risk of eavesdropping by a third
party.
"Justice Brennan thought that the fourth amend-
ment now requires a search warrant both when a lone
agent records a conversation and when third parties are
listening in. He therefore concluded that neither On Lee
nor Lopez is good law. Id. at 755. Justice Douglas' abid-
ing concern with the dangers of electronic surveillance
led him to conclude that the Katz warrant requirement
had superseded On Lee's sanction of non-trespassory
surveillance. Id. at 759-66. Justice Harlan, after care-
fully tracing the cases subsequent to On Lee, also con-
cluded that its trespass rationale is no longer viable. Id.
at 773-84.
The fourth amendment was also examined by the
Court in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). There,
in an opinion by Mr. Justice Blackmun, the Court held
that a home visit by a welfare caseworker prescribed
as a pre-condition for public assistance under New
York's administration of its Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children program did not violate rights guar-
Putting aside the various nuances developed in
this fragmentation of views, it is almost too trite
to say that the basic difference reflected in the
decision is in the value judgments made by the
majority and the minority regarding the interest
of law enforcement in making the most efficient
use of modem electronic devices and the interest
of the individual in maintaining his privacy against
the inroads of those same devices. The opinion of
Mr. Justice White undertakes to minimize the
significance of the difference by emphasizing that
no more is disclosed than the informer himself
could have testified to.2 4 The dissenters put the
issue in an entirely different context by emphasiz-
ing the encouragement to governmental bugging
of all sorts of private communications, so long as
a single cooperator can be found who can win the
confidence of the subject of the investigation.
2 5
Another five-four decision with a slightly differ-
ent alignment illustrates the varying approaches
of Justices Black and Harlan to the fifth as dis-
tinguished from the fourth amendment. In Dutton
v. Evans26 the issue was whether testimony about
what the defendant's co-conspirator had said to
the witness-apparently implicating both himself
and the defendant in the crime-could be admitted
in a state trial as an exception to the hearsay rule
recognized by the state law, without violating the
defendant's constitutional right of confrontation.
This time Mr. Justice Harlan joined the majority
but not the plurality opinion of Justice Stewart,
while Mr. Justice Black joined Justices Marshall,
Douglas, and Brennan in dissent. Apart from
minor issues as to the prejudicial character of the
statement and its credibility, the principal question
was whether the sixth amendment required the
states to follow the federal rule excluding such
statements. Although Mr. Justice Harlan admitted
to a preference for the federal exclusionary rule as
anteed by the fourth amendment. Mr. Justice Black-
mun found that despite features of home visitation sim-
ilar to search and seizure in a criminal sense, the visits
constituted no violation of privacy. The Blackmun
opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices
Black, Stewart, and Harlan, and a concurring opinion
was submitted by Mr. Justice White, who differed with
the majority on only one point. Dissents were filed by
Justice Douglas and Justice Marshall; the latter was
joined by Mr. Justice Brennan.
401 U.S. at 751.
2 See, e.g., Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion, Id. at
787-89.
26400 U.S. 74 (1970). Petitioner's co-conspirator
made the following remark as he was being returned to
jail following his arraignment: "If it hadn't been for
that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in
this now." Id. at 77.
[VCol. 62
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opposed to the state rule, he did not regard it as
mandated by the sixth amendment.27 Problems of
hearsay, Mr. Justice Harlan said, were not to be
confused with the right of confrontation.28 In the
dissenters' view, as reflected in Justice Marshall's
opinion, this concern about the incorporation of
the hearsay rule, with its various exceptions, into
the confrontation clause was irrelevant. The sig-
nificant fact was the admission of an incriminating
statement attributed to an alleged accomplice
who was not available for cross-examination.2
This they quite justifiably regarded as a more
serious qualification of the right of confrontation
than that permitted in California v. Green,'0 where
the maker of the statement was in fact subject to
cross-examination, both when it was first made
and later at the trial. While the particular state-
ment was of marginal significance in the case, the
principle involved may well have major ramifica-
tions.
Another outstanding example of the Court's
refusal during the past term to fulfill the possible
implications of prior decisions of the Warren Court
was the holding in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania" and
the companion case of In re Burrus that a jury trial
is not constitutionally required in the adjudicative
stage of juvenile court delinquency proceedings.
In so holding, the Court refused to add another
member of the family to I re Gaultu and its
progeny. As part of the rationale, the plurality
opinion of Mr. Justice Blackmun joined by the
Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice
White, distinguished Duncan v. Louisiana,"3 incor-
porating into due process the right to jury trial in
criminal cases, on the ground that juvenile court
21 Id. at 100.
13 Id. at 94. This position of Justice Harlan disavowed
even his own previous views suggested in California v.
Green that the confrontation clause established a pref-
erential rule requiring the prosecutor to avoid the use
of hearsay whenever it was reasonably possible to do so.
"400 U.S. at 103, 110. Justice Marshall saw a close
similarity between Dutton and Douglas v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 415 (1965), where a co-conspirator refused to
be cross-examined regarding a statement allegedly
made by him. There the Court found that the prosecu-
tion's reading of the statement to the co-conspirator,
when he could not be cross-examined, amounted to a
denial of the right of confrontation.
0399 U.S. 149 (1970).
"191 S. Ct. 1976 (1971).
2387 U.S. 1 (1967). Gault held that certain proce-
dural due process standards were required at the ad-
judicatory stage of the juvenile proceeding. In re Win-
ship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), mandated the beyond-a-rea-
sonable-doubt standard of proof, also at the adjudica-
tory stage.
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
proceedings are not criminal trials.n But Mr. jus-
tice Harlan, who concurred in the judgment,
would do so only on the theory that Duncan should
be overruled so as to eliminate jury trial entirely
from the requirements of due process. 35 Justices
Douglas, Black, and Marshall, the only complete
dissenters, also -regarded Duncan as controlling.
Justice Brennan concurred in McKeiver and dis-
sented in Burrus on the ground that in the first
case the accused juvenile could insist on a public
trial, while in the second case he could not.35 Ob-
viously there were enough different strains of legal
reasoning to provide an interesting set of varia-
tions, but nothing to suggest a common theme. For
the time being at least, Gault and Duncan appear
to be impregnable, but they are not likely to be ex-
panded appreciably by the present Court.
The shadow of the death penalty hung over this
past term, as it has over several previous ones.
Again the constitutionality of the penalty itself
was not directly presented, but its brooding omni-
presence permeated several other issues. Most
prominent among these were the issues presented
in McGautha v. CaliforniaF and its companion
case, Crampton v. Ohio. The Crampton issue was
the validity of a unitary trial, as distinguished
from a bifurcated one, for dealing with both guilt
and punishment; the issue common to both cases
was the necessity for standards for governing the*
choice of the death penalty. A six-three majority,
Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissent-
ing, rejected the claims that a. unitary trial violated
"91 S. Ct. at 1984-85.
'5 Id. at 1992.
36 Id. at 1991-92. Justice Brennan looked for alterna-
tive guaranties, as suggested in Duncan, which might
render the jury trial unnece-sary in juvenile proceed-
ings. He thought that a public trial performs a jury-
like function because the glare of publicity supposedly
acts as a check on judicial highhandedness. But Duncan
does not appear to have contemplated that a public
trial is an alternative guarantee which serves the pur-
pose of a jury. Instead, Duncan noted that some equi-
table non-jury criminal system could be fashioned, yet
none of the American states, all of which afford public
trials, had undertaken to construct such a system. 391
U.S. at 150, n.14.
402 U.S. 183,(1971). The Court will again face ques-
tions raised by the imposition of capital punishment in
the 1971 Term. The Court has agreed to review four
cases expressly presenting the question:
Does the imposition and carrying out of the death
penalty in this case constitute cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments?
Aikens v. California, cert. granted, 91 S. Ct. 2280 (1971);
Furman v. Georgia, cert. granted, 91 S. Ct. 2282 (1971);
Jackson v. Georgia, cert. granted, 91 S. Ct. 2287 (1971);
Branch v. Texas, cert. granted, 91 S. Ct. 2287 (1971).
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both the privilege against self-incrimination and
due process, as well as the claim that failure to
provide standards to guide the jury in choosing
between the death penalty and a lesser sentence
was a denial of due process. The opinion for the
Court by Mr. Justice Harlan did not deny that
bifurcated trials had much to commend them as
superior to unitary ones." Instead it emphasized
that neither the history of the privilege against
self-incrimination nor its more recent applications
supported the thesis that a defendant forced to
choose between complete silence on the issue of
punishment and the risk of exposing himself to
cross-examination on the issue of guilt was, in
effect, being forced to surrender either the privi-
lege or fundamental fairness in the sense of the
right to plead for mercy. This historical and ana-
lytical argument was supplemented with Justice
Harlan's customary homily on the distinction be-
tween constitutional adjudication and the develop-
ment of "trial procedures that are the best of all
worlds." 19 To these issues Mr. Justice Douglas
responded for the dissenters with one of the most
elaborate and impressive opinions which he has
written in some time, challenging both Mr. Justice
Harlan's "static" view of due process4° and his
refusal to follow the implications of prior opinions,
including his own in Simmons v. United States and
Mr. Justice Stewart's in United States v. Jackson.4'
The debate between Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr.
Justice Douglas is one of the best expressions we
have so far of the difference between the remnants
of the Warren Court at its fullest bloom, and the
Burger Court as it begins to establish some iden-
tity of its own. The debate between Justices Harlan
and Brennan on the other issue in McGautha, the
necessity for standards governing choice of the
death penalty, is much less interesting and sig-
nificant, except insofar as it presages a similar
division regarding the validity of the death penalty
itself.
It may be of some interest to compare the atti-
tudes of the Court in criminal or quasi-criminal
cases with the attitudes expressed on some other
38 402 U.S. at 221.
3Id.
0 Id. at 241. Justice Douglas termed the Court's
position "wooden" and added:
It is as though a dam had suddenly been placed
across the stream of the law on procedural due
process, a stream which has grown larger with the
passing years.41 Id. at 238. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.
377 (1968); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570
(1968).
major constitutional issues during the past term.
The most obvious contrast is presented by the
school busing4 cases where a unanimous Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Burger, rejected
both the President's philosophy on the subject of
busing and the suggestions of his Solicitor General
supporting desegregation solutions which would
minimize the necessity for its useA' The Chief
Justice's opinions in all three of the cases present-
ing these problems were a sweeping vindication of
the authority of the federal courts to require effec-
tive desegregation of previously segregated or
"dual" school systems, including the use of such
devices as "pairing" of previously all black and
white schools, and a substantial exchange of
students from distant neighborhoods with the aid
of busing. Nevertheless, the Chief Justice was
also careful to limit the rationale of the opinions
to the accomplishment of desegregation against a
background of previously compelled school segre-
gation.4 Indeed, the Chief Justice even went a
little out of his way to say:
We do not reach in this case the question whether
a showing that school segregation is a consequence
of other types of state action, without any discrim-
inatory action by the school authorities, is a con-
42 Swam v. Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971);
Davis v. Board of School Commissioners, 402 U.S. 33
(1971); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971);
Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
41 A recent expression of the President's view on bus-
ing is found in his statement announcing the Justice
Department's appeal in an Austin, Texas, desegrega-
tion case. The President's statement said in part:
I am against busing as that term is commonly used
in school desegregation cases. I have consistently
opposed the busing of our nation's schoolchildren
to achieve a racial balance, and I am opposed to
the busing of children simply for the sake of bus-
ing.
From statement of President Nixon, quoted in N.Y.
Times, Aug. 4, 1971, at 15, col. 1.
The brief for the United States, as amicus curiae, in
Swann and Davis recommended remanding the Swann
case to the district court for further reconsideration
under appropriate standards, rather than outright ap-
proval of the district court's order requiring extensive
busing in order to eliminate segregation. The brief also
recommcnded aff imance of the Court of Appeals dc-"
cision in Davis which had approved a plan which pre-
served the neighborhood-school principle at the expense
of more complete desegregation. Brief for the United
States, pp. 27-30. The Supreme Court's decisions re-
jected both of these suggestions.
44 See, e.g., the Chief Justice's comments in Swann v.
Board of Education: "The objective today remains to
eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-
imposed segregation." 402 U.S. at 15. "We turn now to
the problem of defining with more particularity the re-
sponsibilities of school authorities in desegregating a
state-enforced dual school system.... ." Id. at 1.
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stitutional violation requiring remedial action by
a school desegregation decree."
And again: "Absent a constitutional violation
there would be no basis for judicially ordering as-
signment of students on a racial basis." 41 In short,
there is no basis afforded in the rationale of these
opinions for the argument that de facto school seg-
regation, resulting even from prior discriminatory
land use controls, would justify similar desegrega-
tion decrees designed to achieve integrated
schools 47
Similarly in dealing with a series of reapportion-
ment problems, the Court during the past term suc-
ceeded in hewing close to the line of clearly estab-
lished principles, while sedulously declining the in-
vitation to break new ground by developing any
further the philosophy of the reapportionment
cases. This attitude was especially apparent in
Whitcomb v. Chavis,4" where a three-judge district
court had held invalid the use of multi-membered
electoral districts as the basis for representation of
densely populated counties in the Indiana legisla-
ture. The district court found that this electoral
system in effect prevented the ghetto population of
Indianapolis from electing an appropriate number
of representatives from their own area.4 9 The ma-
jority of the Court sustained the district court's
finding of invalid apportionment in so far as it was
based upon population variations among different
districts with the same number of representatives,
where those variations were in excess of or very
nearly equal to variations held invalid in previous
Supreme Court cases. 50 For the purpose of prescrib-
ing the appropriate remedy, however, the plurality
opinion of Justice White, joined in by the Chief
Justice, Mr. Justice Black, and in substantial part
by Mr. Justice Stewart, rejected entirely the dis-
trict court's holding of "racial gerrymandering,"
both because it was inadequately supported by the
record, and also because it "would spawn endless
11Id. at 23.
46 Id. at 28.
7 Chief Justice Burger emphasized the limitations in
the Swann decision as he denied a stay from a busing
order in Winston-Salem-Forsyth County, North Caro-
lina. He wrote:
[Ilf the Court of Appeals or the District Court read
this Court's opinions as requiring a fixed racial
balance or quota, they would appear to have over-
looked specific language of the opinion in the Swann
case to the contrary.
From opinion of Chief Justice Burger, quoted in N.Y.
Times, Sept. 1, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
48403 U.S. 124 (1971).
" Id. at 133.
50 Id. at 161-63.
litigation concerning the multi-membered districts
systems now widely employed in this country." 51
Justice White envisaged similar claims being made
on behalf of other groups, such as "union-oriented
workers, the university community, religious or
ethnic groups occupying identifiable areas of our
heterogeneous cities and urban areas." 2 Mr.
Justice Douglas, on the other hand, speaking for
himself and Justices Brennan and Marshall ex-
pressed the view that the district court had "done
an outstanding job, bringing insight to the prob-
lem." " It is a pretty good bet that Chief Justice
Warren and Mr. Justice Fortas would also have
joined in that view, if they had had the chance.
Another example of a refusal to extend an equal
protection principle the slightest bit beyond its
previous dimensions was James v. Valtlierra,M which
sustained a state constitutional provision requiring
that low rent housing projects be approved by a
majority of those voting in a community referen-
dum. Mr. Justice Black, writing for the majority,
distinguished Hunter v. Erickson5  on the ground
that the city charter provision there struck down-
because it required a referendum before enforce-
ment of an ordinance forbidding racial, religious or
ancestral discrimination in housing--created a clas-
sification based on race and consequently bore a
"heavier burden of justification than other classifi-
cations." 56 One can hardly blame Mr. Justice
Black for adapting the language of the opinion in
Erickson to his own purposes, even though he was
there the sole dissenter, but this was hardly respon-
sive to Mr. Justice Marshall's dissenting argument:
51 Id. at 157.
Old. at 156.
53 Id. at 180.
402 U.S. 137 (1971). Petitioners, who were eligible
for low-cost public housing but who had been denied it
by a referendum held in accordance with Article
XXXIV of the California Constitution, brought suit to
have that article declared unconstitutioial. Article
XXXIV prvided that no low-cost housing project
should be developed, constructed, or acquired in any
manner by a state public body until the project was
approved by a majority of those voting at a community
election.
5 393 U.S. 385 (1969). In Erickson petitioner prayed
for the enforcement of an Akron, Ohio, fair housing
ordinance. The mayor of Akron had refused to enforce
the ordinance because, being an ordinance regulating
the use of land based on race, religion, and origin, it had
not been approved by a majority of the eiectors in a
general election as required by Akron City Charter
§ 137. The Court held that § 137 placed a special burden
on racial minorities by making it more difficult to enact
legislation on their behalf and thus constituted a denial
of the equal protection of the laws.
56 402 U.S. at 140-41.
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It is far too late in the day to contend that the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only racial dis-
crimination; and ... singling out the poor to bear a
burden not placed on any other class of citizens
tramples the values that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was designed to protect.17
It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Blackmun
as well as Mr. justice Brennan joined the Marshall
dissent; presumably Mr. Justice Douglas would
have too, if he had participated. Nevertheless, it is
also worth noting that Mr. Justice White, who
wrote the opinion in Erickson and Justices Harlan
and Stewart who concurred in it, joined Mr. Justice
Black's opinion, indicating that they found his dis-
tinctions satisfactory. In short, Valtierra is an ideal
rock against which to shatter over-simplified ideo-
logical classifications of the Justices.
Turning from equal protection to first amend-
ment issues, the Court on the whole exhibited a
stronger stance, although here too there were quali-
fications that might not have been anticipated from
the Warren Court in its latter years. The outstand-
ing examples were the "Attorney Oath" cases in
which the Court by five-four votes struck down
Arizona 5 and Ohio59 inquiries into the associations
and beliefs of applicants for admission to the bar,
but, by similar votes, upheld slightly different in-
quiries required for admission to the New York
bar.W° Mr. Justice Stewart was the "swing man,"
7Id. at 145.
5s Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
Petitioner had applied for admission to the Arizona
Bar, but the Bar Committee declined to process her
application solely because she refused to answer whether
she had been a member of the Communist Party or any
organization that advocated overthrow of the United
States Government by force or violence. The concurring
opinion written by Mr. Justice Black held that the
power of a state to make inquiries about a person's be-
liefs or associations is limited by the first amendment.
The opinion went on to say, "we hold that views and
beliefs are immune from bar association inquisitions de-
signed to lay a foundation for barring an applicant from
the practice of law. Clearly Arizona has engaged in such
questioning here." Id. at 8.
19 In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 24 (1971). Here petitioner
refused in his application for membership to the Ohio
Bar to state whether he had been a member of any or-
ganization which advocates the overthrow of the gov-
ernment of the United States by force. As in Baird v.
State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971), the Court held
there was no legitimate state interest which would out-
weigh the first amendment protection from being
penalized for one's beliefs and associations; conse-
quently, to deny petitioner membership in the Ohio Bar
was error.
60Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v.
Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971). This case challenged
the presence of a question on the application for the
New York Bar which asked if the applicant was a mem-
who was in the majority in all three cases and wrote
for the Court in the New York case. For him one
decisive difference was that New York explicitly
asked not only whether the applicants had ever
been members of organizations which advocated
overthrow of the government by force and violence,
but also whether they had the specific intent of
furthering such organizational aims." For the other
members of the majority in the Arizona and Ohio
cases, who also constituted the dissenters in the
New York case, (Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan
and Marshall), the difference was immaterial be-
cause the inquiry was still into the area of personal
beliefs and loyalties rather than conduct. The total
effect of the cases seems to be that state bar com-
mittees may still inquire into suspect associations,
provided the inquiry is simultaneously coupled
with inquiry as to the specific individual intent to
advance the unlawful aims of the association. Since
the inquiry with respect to membership in the asso-
ciation must be answered irrespective of the answer
with respect to individual intent it is difficult to
attribute any lasting significance to the decisions in
the Arizona and Ohio cases or to Mr. Justice
Stewart's principal distinction, except that mem-
bership alone may not be the basis for denial of ad-
mission to the bar.
Turning to another aspect of the first amend-
ment, it may well be that the most socially signifi-
cant decisions of the term were those concerning
aid to parochial schools. 2 So far as the basic social
conflict was concerned the decisions were a stand-
off. State aid to parochial elementary and second-
ary schools, designed to share the burden of the
costs of instruction-primarily teachers' salaries-
was invalidated even though limited to secular in-
ber of an organization advocating overthrow of the
United States Government and if so, whether the appli-
cant held the specific intent to overthrow it. The Court
held that such a question was tailored to conform to the
relevant decisions of the Court. Citing Koningsberg v.
State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961), it stated, "It is well
settled that Bar examiners may ask about Communist
affiliations as a preliminary to further inquiry into the
nature of the association and may exclude an applicant
for refusal to answer." 401 U.S. at 165-66.
61401 U.S. at 165-66. Mr. Justice Stewart took seri-
ously the emphasis on individual knowledge and intent
in United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) and Keyi-
shian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) as the
key which determines whether the associational ac-
tivities involved in membership in the Communist
Party can be penalized without violating the constitu-
tional protection of freedom of speech.
12 Tilton v. Richardson, 91 S. Ct. 2091 (1971), Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 91 S. Ct. 2105 (1971).
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struction.6 Federal aid to church supported institu-
tions of higher learning, on the other hand, was sus-
tained provided it was for buildings which were to
be used only for secular purposes." Chief Justice
Burger who wrote the principal opinions in both
cases--although he spoke for the Court only in in-
validating the state statutes65 -applied as his
guiding principle the test he adumbrated the pre-
vious term in Walz v. Tax Commission:'6 namely,
"sponsorship, financial support, and active involve-
ment of the sovereign in religious activity." 6 More
particularly, he also adopted the warning of Mr.
Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Walz
against "programs whose very nature is apt to en-
tangle the state in the details of administration." Is
In terms of logic the test is an elusive one-as dis-
senters on both sides of the fence complained. Mr.
Justice White was the only one who would have
sustained the state as well as the federal statutes
because he could not see the great difference be-
tween buildings and teachers. Justices Douglas and
Black would have invalidated them all and Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall would have gone al-
most as far, although Mr. Justice Brennan would
preserve an opportunity for the colleges to show
that they are really secular institutions. My own
guess is that the Chief Justice's pragmatic com-
promise, despite its theoretical deficiencies, will
serve as the touchstone of decision for some time
to come.
Of course, no one can comment on the Term as a
whole without mentioning the final flourish which
brought it to a close-the cases involving the
"Id. In Lemon, state statutes of Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island which provided state aid to church-related
elementary and secondary schools were challenged. The
Pennsylvania statute provided financial support by
way of reimbursement for the cost of teachers' salaries,
text books, and instructional materials in specified sub-
jects. Rhode Island's statute provided for the payment
of 15% of the salaries of teachers of non-public ele-
mentary schools.
"Tilton v. Richardson, 91 S. Ct. 2091 (1971). This
appeal involved the constitutionality of Title I of the
Higher Education Facilities Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 701-58
(1964), which provides construction grants to colleges
and universities for buildings and facilities used ex-
clusively for secular educational purposes.
" In Lemon, Chief Justice Burger spoke only for
himself and for Justices Stewart, Harlan, and Black-
mun.
6"397 U.S. 664 (1970). Appellant sought an injunc-
tion in New York Courts to prevent property tax
exemptions from being given to religious organizations
for properties used solely for religious worship. The
Court held such exemptions were not in violation of the
first amendment.
67 91 S. Ct. at 2111.
11Id. at 2112.
"Pentagon Papers." 69 Again I hazard a guess
which it will take many years to disprove. Future
students of the Court-looking at the opinions
themselves and having no special interest in the
Vietnam War or its social consequences-will
wonder what the fuss was all about. None of the
three dissenting justices (the Chief Justice, Mr.
Justice Harlan, and Mr. Justice Blackmun) denied
the basic premise of the Court's brief per curiam
opinion: "Any system of prior restraints of expres-
sion comes to this Court bearing a heavy presump-
tion against its constitutional validity." 70 They
simply argued that the government had not had an
adequate opportunity to meet that burden2' The
majority obviously disagreed for a variety of rea-
sons, no one of which could satisfy a majority of the
Court. So the law of the first amendment-espe-
cially the law of prior restraint--came out of the
New York Times case just about as it was when it
went in-resting primarily upon the opinion of
Chief Justice Hughes in Near v. Minnesota.72 Even
the facts to which the principle was applied must
remain something of a mystery so long as the final
submissions of the Solicitor General are locked in
secrecy. Perhaps a later case will test one of the
questions explicitly reserved by Mr. Bickel, counsel
for the New York Times-particularly the power of
Congress to provide explicitly for the kind of rem-
edy which the government sought, an omission
which some members of the majority regarded as
decisive. If this omission is ever remedied, we may
61 New York Times Co. v. United States, 91 S. Ct.
2140 (1971). This case resulted from the attempt of the
United States Government to enjoin the newspapers
from publishing a classified study on United States
policy in Viet Nam. The Court held that the govern-
ment had not met its burden of showing justification
for a restraint on publication and therefore denied the
injunctions.
70 91 S. Ct. 2140 (1971).
71 Id. at 2159.
72 283 U.S. 697 (1931). Near involved the constitu-
tionality of a Minnesota statute declaring that anyone
engaged in the publication of a malicious, scandalous or
defamatory periodical was guilty of a nuisance. In de-
claring the statute to be a restraint on freedom of the
press, Chief Justice Hughes stated that freedom of the
press is an essential element of a free state, but added,
[T]he protection even as to previous restraint is not
absolutely unlimited. But the limitation has been
recognized only in exceptional cases: 'When a na-
tion is at war many things that might be said in
time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that
their utterance will not be endured so long as men
fight and that no Court could regard them as pro-
tected by any constitutional right.' Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
283 U.S. at 716.
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learn more about the law of prior restraint and less
about the inner workings of the Pentagon.
Turning again from substance to procedure, a
characteristic of the Warren Court which some-
times troubled even those who admired its substan-
tive accomplishments was its willingness to antici-
pate constitutional questions when a higher regard
for Brandeisan principles of constitutional adjudi-
cation would have counseled abstinence or avoid-
ance. An outstanding example of this was Dom-
browski v. Pfiser,7 which seemed to announce
rather flat-footedly that the ordinary principle of
abstention by the federal courts in favor of state
court interpretation of state statutes had no ap-
plication
where a statute regulating speech is properly at-
tacked on its face and where the conduct charged in
the indictments is not within the reach of an ac-
ceptable limiting construction readily to be antic-
ipated as the result of a single criminal prosecution
and is not the sort of 'hard core' conduct that would
obviously be prohibited under any construction.7 4
In all probability the principle announced in
Dombrowski was not an easy one to apply, but there
is little doubt that its effect was to encourage the
lower federal courts to decide free speech cases
which had previously generally been supposed to be
within the ambit of the abstention doctrine. That
was certainly the effect upon the three-judge courts
which decided on their merits a series of free speech
cases, 75 especially Younger v. Harris,76 only to be
reversed by an almost unanimous Court during the
past term. Mr. Justice Douglas was alone in insist-
ing on being absolutely faithful to the apparent
sweep of the Dombrowski opinion, while Justices
Brennan, White, and Marshall contented them-
selves with concurring in the result rather than the
opinions for the Court by Mr. Justice Black. Be-
sides qualifying the so-called "chilling effect" doc-
trine of Dombrowski, Mr. Justice Black's principal
- 380 U.S. 479 (1965). Appellant, a civil rights or-
ganization, brought suit for an injunction and declar-
atory relief to restrain threats of prosecution under a
Louisiana Subversive Activities Act which it alleged
violated its right of free speech.
74 Id. at 491-92.
75 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v.
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401
U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971);
Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971).
76 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Harris sued to enjoin prosecu-
tion under the California Criminal Syndicalism Act
contending that the Act inhibited his freedom of speech.
opinion went so far as to say:
Procedures for testing the constitutionality of a
statute apparently contemplated by Domorowski
and for then enjoining all action to enforce the
statute until the State can obtain court approval
for a modified version, are fundamentally at odds
with the function of the federal courts in our con-
stitutional plan.
77
When Chief Justice Burger read that passage, he
must have congratulated himself on his prescience
in assigning the Court's opinion to Mr. Justice
Black. It would be difficult to better epitomize at
least one aspect of the difference in mood between
the Warren and Burger Courts. Other examples of
the same basic difference might also be mentioned,
such as the severely limiting construction given to
the District of Columbia abortion statute, in pref-
erence to a determination of its unconstitutional-
ity.78
One final word of disavowal may be in order.
Throughout this essay I have unabashedly used the
shorthand expressions "Warren Court" and
"Burger Court." In so doing I have myself adapted
to current fashions with some misgivings. Doubt-
less the "Warren Court" had over the years ac-
quired certain identifying characteristics which to
an appreciable extent also reflected the philosophy
and even the personality of the Chief Justice. It is
much too early to say the same of the present Chief
Justice and his Court. But it is also inviting to
speculate that the Chief Justice, looking back over
the past term, may well feel more comfortable with
its handiwork than he did with the previous term's
accomplishments. Certainly he was less often in
dissent and more often spoke authoritatively for
the Court on matters of great moment. In several
other instances majority opinions obviously re-
flected his own deep convictions. What to some of
us may have seemed unfortunate retreats from high
ground which should not have been surrendered, to
him must have seemed much needed rectifications
77 Id. at 52.
78 United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971). Pe-
titioner was indicted for producing abortions in viola-
tion of D.C. Conx ENCYCL. ANN. § 22-201 (1967),
which prohibited abortions unless necessary to preserve
the life or health of the patient. The court held that the
statute and in particular the word "health" was not
vague and therefore not unconstitutional. It indicated
that "health" had a precise meaning in moder day
usage-the psychological and physical well-being of the
patient.
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